No more daring and gallant service was rendered during the War of the Rebellion
than the capture of Selma, and the onus of this capture lay largely with the
Fourth Ohio Cavalry.The following account of the battle of Selma, extracted
from a report rendered to the Government concerning the military career of the
late General Eli Long, tells a graphic tale of the intrepidity of the Fourth
Ohio Volunteer Cavalry:
"The City of Selma is situated on a sandy plain, stretching northward from
the Alabama River, and merging in a succession of hills with the plateau of
which they form the spurs two or three miles distant. The river at this point,
500 to 800 yards wide, with a deep and rapid current, rendered the city
unassailable on the south, while the remaining sides were protected by a
crescent of strong earthworks, subdented by the river, flanked on the east by a
swamp extending to the Burnsville Road, and on the west by Mill Creek, and
obstructed by a abatis of field timber and brush. The works, themselves of
earth, strengthened by revetments of heavy masses bound by willows with strong
bastions at salient angles, were constructed with all the skill and resources of
the best engineering talent. The embrasures enfiladed about five feet deep,
partially filled with water, and extending around the entire front. The main
parapets of regular profile were about ten feet high and upon the glacis was a
stockade of heavy picket longs about six feet high and sharpened at the top.
Thirty-two pieces of artillery of large caliber looked grimly from the
embrasures, placed to sweep every point of attack and concentrate a fire upon
the roads forming the only approaches to the city."
Such was the location and defenses of Selma when, on the 2d of April, 1865, the
Union troops came before the breastworks. Long's Division was in the advance;
it was late in the afternoon, and fearing to delay until all of the troops had
arrived before making the assault, it was decided to literally hurl the advance
guard upon the city, hoping by the suddenness of attack to find the Confederate
forces unprepared. The report just quoted says: "At about 4 p. m. a lively
firing was heard on the right rear of Long's Division, indicating an attack
upon his lead horses and pack train, and rightly conjecturing it to be from a
portion of Forrest's troops, who had been cut off in the rapid advance, Long
determined upon an instant attack, relying on his rear guard to hold them at
bay. It was a critical juncture, and was met with Long's characteristic
boldness and military wisdom. Dispatching a regiment from the reserve to
reinforce the rear guard, who were advantageously posted behind a cover of
timber, he ordered an immediate assault, himself leading his gallant division
on foot. General Wilson galloped to the scene of action and comprehending the
necessity and wisdom of the movement, himself took part of the charge with his
headquarters guard, the Fourth Regular Cavalry, on the Centerville Road.
Rodney and Robinson, with their batteries, were at once put forward at close
range to occupy the enemy and conceal the noise of firing in the rear, and at
the same time Long's line dashed forward over the open space in front of the
works. Inspired by his heroic example, they moved rapidly from there cover with
steady precision over the intervening 1100 yards, under heavy fire from the
works, which soon became enveloped in smoke, destroying the accuracy of the
enemy's aim. When they reached the abatis the enemy, by common consent, had
ceased firing, evidently reserving their fire until they should see the
bluecoats at close range. A period of almost total silence ensued --until the
Federals had almost reached the stockade --when suddenly the works fairly
swarmed with greycoats and blazed with the fire of artillery and musketry.
The advancing line, by common impulse, dropped flat upon the ground and crawled
forward rapidly until they reached the obstruction of brush, where it was somewhat
delayed in clambering through the marsh into which the men sank knee-deep.
Still it pressed toward the dense cloud of smoke, which, fortunately for them,
again enveloped the works and concealed them from the enemy's gaze. Reaching
the stockade, as yet without firing a shot, with a moment's breathing spell,
the Second Division --not knowing, fortunately, that Long was lying shot down
behind them --opened a sudden withering fire, and clambering over the pickets
as the boys play leapfrog, the more active boosting their comrades, surging
through the ditch and charged up the parapet with wild cheers. It was the
crises, but it was over sooner than word can describe it. The enemy were beaten
down and hurled back with a force that no one could withstand.
About 7000 men were behind the defenses at Selma, about 3000 of whom were
captured with arms, together with a quantity of field and heavy artillery in
position in the works. In the arsenal and navy factory immense quantities of
war materials of all kinds, including thirty pieces of artillery in position, a
thirty-pound Parrot, 200 pieces of artillery in the works and arsenal, small
arms, ammunition and a vast amount of materials of war, including 3500 bales of
cotton; also a large number of prisoners --militia and a great portion of
Forrest's Cavalry.
Selma was the principle manufacturing center of the Confederacy for army and
railway supplies. Besides the immense naval foundry, a large manufacturing
arsenal was engaged in producing ammunition for field guns and small arms,
together with every variety of war equipment. A large number of private machine
shops and foundries were in the active service of the Government. All these,
with their accumulated products and immense productive capacity were destroyed.
This assault and capture by General Long with 1200 men in line is of the most
brilliant cavalry achievements of the war."
In commenting on the results of the battle many years later, General H Wilson
said: "Division commander and every regimental and brigade commander
except one engaged in that assault were wounded or killed. Had the war not
ended at that time General Long would have become widely known and celebrated.
As it was, his great performance passed practically unnoticed."
The real significance of the battle lay in a point of stratagem. Colonel Long,
in a sketch of the Selma campaign read before the Fourth Ohio Volunteer Cavalry
Association in 1867, thus describes the reasons for the attack:
" Leaving Chickasaw, Ala., a romantic village on the south bank of the
Tennessee River, on the 22d of march, we started for Selma, Ala., all in good
marching order except a small squad (but few of those whom, I believe, belonged
to the Fourth Ohio), who had bad horses at the start and had used them up, and
were consequently now on foot; but I am sorry to say that some of them I knew
to have had good horses and to have used them up with their carelessness and
neglect of duty in not properly attending to them, or from inattention,
thinking that if they had no horses they could stay behind. For this class I
had no sympathy, and was rather glad of the opportunity of trying the
experiment of a few days' tramp on them, thinking the lesson would be of
service to them and the horses they should get in the future. On account of
those whose horses had given out through no fault of their own, I regretted the
necessity of their having to walk, but was unable to make the distinction and,
as I had conjectured on starting, it was not many days before the dismounted
men were all supplied with horses, their equipments having been transported
with the column in wagons, and I was gratified to afterwards observe that the
men who had been dismounted took splendid care of their horses when they got
them, and have no doubt that those of them who have been fortunate enough to
survive it have congratulated themselves ever since that they participated in
this --as I think it was --the most brilliant cavalry campaign of the war.
Starting out, as before mentioned, on the 22d of March from Chickasaw, Ala., we
made the first day's march without any incident worthy of note occurring. On
the second day, by some mistake, probably my own, we got on the wrong road by
which we were somewhat delayed, as well as the command immediately in our rear
--General McCook's --owing to the wretched state of the roads, frequently
having to double teams and sometimes almost literally to dig wagons out of the
ground. However, as was our custom, we got out of the worst part of the road at
last and moved on. Our horses were well provided for, and probably better than
those of the rest of the corps, on account of the long, bag-like forage sacks,
slit in the middle, that we had, and which enabled us to carry three or four
days' forage and which carried us safely over the mountainous portions of North
Alabama into the valleys or low lands, where forage was more abundant, or at
least where there was some.
"Moving on for several days, the command in front of us on the road,
having occasional skirmishes with the enemy, and some pretty sharp ones, too,
ourselves sending out parties on each side of the road to look for horses
--these parties sometimes capturing scattering rebels and sometimes getting
captured themselves --we at length at a place called Ebenezer Church, where
Forrest, with a determination to check us or do worse if he could, had posted
what men he could gather together on the north side of a stream running
perpendicularly across the road, either with no idea of being defeated or with
a want of confidence in his men, and for that reason posting his command in a
position where they could retreat, but with great difficulty. They were,
however, dislodged from their position after a short but sharp engagement in
which they lost about 200 prisoners and I think three pieces of artillery,
General Upton's Division capturing most of the prisoners and two pieces of
artillery, as his command was mounted and we were operating on foot. Marching
along as soon as the killed, wounded and prisoners could be cared for, with
light skirmishing and with small scouting parties of the enemy in our front, we
at length arrived in front of Selma, Ala., on the 2d of April, 1865. And now
was come the time to show our commanding officers who, to judge from their
letters, orders, etc., had thought we were laggards in delaying so long at
Louisville, and to show the newspapers of semi-rebel proclivities that had
delighted in abusing and vilifying us, and our friends at home who were
watching for us with fond and anxious hearts, and perchance offering up many a
silent prayer for our welfare and success, and above all to show our country
and our Heavenly Ruler that we knew our duty and were determined to do it. Now
was come the time for the true soldier to show that he was determined "to
do or die," without which motto a man had better chose some other
avocation or profession, for he certainly is not fit for a soldier. It was now
our time to do our part, or that allotted to us by the authorities at
Washington in general plans, by our immediate army commander and our gallant
young corps commanders in more detailed plans. It is true that in the original
plans it was not intended or hardly conjectured that we should attack Selma --a
place surrounded by fortifications built by the Rebel General Polk to resist General
Sherman's advance, when he moved out as far as Meridian and returned, and a
place supposed to be capable of effectually resisting an attack of infantry and
that would look with contempt on an attacking force of Calgary. It was not, in
fact, as I understood it, expected that we should attack any fortified city or
town, if it could be avoided --the main object of our movement being to attract
the attention of the enemy and cause them to keep as many troops as possible in
the interior for its defense and to thus prevent them from sending
reinforcements to their army at and about Mobile, which was about being
attacked by our forces, but Wilson's young blood could ill brook to have it
said that with a command of seven or eight thousand cavalry, well mounted and
equipped and thoroughly imbued with the idea of their own invincibility, he
only made "demonstrations," and himself recognizing in its fullest
extent the motto of the distinguished French cavalry soldier and writer on
cavalry, DeBrack, "toujours l'audace, toujours l'audace" (always
audacity, always audacity), he determined to accomplish something that would be
creditable to his command and himself and beneficial to his country, and nobly
did he fulfill and carry out his intentions.
Before arriving in front of Selma the command which I had of the Second
Division had been reduced by details for scouting, picket duty, etc., until,
when I got it in line dismounted, there were only 1238 men in line. General
Upton's Division was on another road to our left, and my orders were to await
the signal of one gun from his line and then to advance on the works with what
effect I could, but while waiting for the signal, with my command drawn up in
line under cover of a small rise in the ground, which did not prevent a man
from being occasionally carried to the rear, either dead or wounded from the
effects of the enemy's cannon shot, it was reported to me that the rebels were
attacking a force which I had left immediately in my rear to guard a bridge
over a large stream. Seeing at the same time the enemy reinforcing his command
constantly in my front, I determined to make the assault at once without
waiting for the signal gun and the Fourth Ohio being at the post of honor, that
is covering the main road into town, we made the assault about 5 o'clock p. m.,
and in twenty- five minutes from the time we commenced to advance the command
was over the main line of works, and Selma, with 2700 prisoners, 200 pieces of
artillery, thirty of them in position, with a vast amount of material of war,
was ours, captured as the result. It is true there was some fighting
afterwards, but the resistance was feeble and desultory after they found that
their main line of works was captured.
The brave old Fourth fully sustained her reputation for fearless gallantry on
this occasion, as her loss showed. Among other gallant spirits who gave their
life to their country's cause, we have to mourn the loss of our soldier, friend
and man in the noblest and truest sense of the word, Colonel Dobb, the commanding
officer of the regiment, and of a no less peerless soldier, Captain Robie,
whose restless spirit always led him into the thickest of the fray. There was
one man of the Fourth, whose name (supposed to have been John A. Booth, of
Company A) I could not learn, who was reported to me to have been killed
literally at the cannon's mouth, as a portion of his body was blown away just
as he was entering the embrasure. The regiment should learn and preserve the
name of this soldier by having his name placed in letters of gold in some
conspicuous part of the history of the regiment. The exact loss of the Fourth I
cannot now remember --the loss of the whole was near one-fourth of the command
killed and wounded inside of twenty-five minutes. This fight, besides being a
handsome thing in itself, was the pivot fight of the campaign, for most or
quite all of the organized and tried troops that the Confederacy had in that
part of the country to make any resistance to our advance were gathered
together here, under Forrest, for the purpose of defeating us, and after the
action they were all either captured or dispersed so far and widely as to be
incapable of troubling us any further, and although considerable resistance was
made to our advance afterwards, it was made principally by militia, and with
perhaps the exception of the fight at Columbus, Ga., to little or no purpose.
Feeling the interest that I did in the Fourth Ohio, I was glad of the
opportunity of sharing with them the glory of this, one of the last fights of
the war, and though it may perhaps be considered indelicate in me to say it
--as handsome and brilliant a feat as has been accomplished by cavalry in
modern times in this or any other war, and relying on this regiment and being
willing to share its fate, whatever it might be. I went into the action with it
and was placed for the time being out of the way of doing any further good or
harm at almost the same instant that Colonel Dobb and Captain Robie were
killed, but after I was struck, and in the few moments for which I retained
consciousness, I had the satisfaction of learning the fighting was nearly over,
and that the city was captured and that we had at length, after our weeks and
months of preparation, accomplished something that would in a measure fill the
expectations of our friends, and that the brave men who were fortunate enough
to pass through the action unscathed would have the satisfaction in the place
of Forrest's men (for whom they had been prepared with no idea of their
defeat), of eating the roast turkeys and other delicacies that were waiting
them. Repeating the assertion which I made at the beginning of this sketch, and
which you by this time have discovered for yourselves to be true, namely, that
there is little intrinsic value or any other kind in this paper, I will, in
conclusion make another, and that is that though I have no relish for the thing
per se, I would almost as soon have gone into an action as to have prepared
this sketch, as meager as it is."