misc corrspondence department of the west

HEADQUARTERS,

Gainesville, Ala., August 2, 1863.

 

GENERAL: At the earliest moment compatible with the performance of other and very pressing duties, I have the honor to present the following report of the operations of the troops in the Department of Mississippi and Eastern Louisiana preceding and during the siege resulting in the capitulation of Vicksburg:

 

The enemy, after long-continued and strenuous efforts to reach the right flank of Vicksburg by forcing a passage through the Upper Yazoo River, finally relinquished his design, and on the night of April 4 and 5 re-embarked his troops, and before daylight was in rapid retreat. About the same time a heavy force of the enemy, which had been collected at Baton Rouge, was mostly withdrawn and transferred to Western Louisiana, leaving but one DIVISION to occupy that place. After consultation by telegraph with Major-General Gardner, commanding Port Hudson and the THIRD Military District, deeming the garrison at Port Hudson more than sufficient under existing circumstances, and to save supplies at a point so difficult to provide, the navigation of the Mississippi River being obstructed to us, and the mouth of Red River, from whence large quantities of subsistence stores were drawn, being blockaded by one of the enemy's gunboats, I ordered [A.] Rust's brigade and two regiments, under Brigadier-General [A.] Buford, to proceed immediately to Jackson, MISS., with the then view of employing them against raids of the enemy in Northern Mississippi, my great deficiency in cavalry leaving that portion of the department almost without protection.

 

About March 11, fearing that the enemy might succeed in opening a canal practicable for the passage of transports across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, I deemed it necessary to occupy Grand Gulf, near the mouth of the Big Black, and assigned Brigadier General John S. Bowen, with his Missouri brigade, to that point, with instructions to construct batteries for the protection of the mouth of the Big Black, and as a secondary obstacle to the navigation of the Mississippi River. General Bowen was also directed to look well to the approaches by the Bayou Pierre. He subsequently informed me that he had prepared for the defense on both sides of the bayou.

 

On the 22nd, five heavy guns were mounted and ready for service. Two of these were removed from the batteries at Vicksburg, and three, intended for gunboats being built in the Trans-Mississippi Department, were detained by my order, it being impracticable to obtain them elsewhere. At the same time the enemy commenced his movement to reach Vicksburg by the Hushpuckanaw and Deer Creek. Another expedition was also attempted through Steele's Bayou via Rolling Fork and the Sunflower, the object of both being to enter the Yazoo River above Haynes' Bluff. In these designs he was completely baffled. Many of our smaller boats, which were alone fitted for the navigation of these streams, and which were employed in the transportation of supplies for Vicksburg, were necessarily diverted from this purpose to transport troops to meet and repel these expeditions. The same interruption in the transportation of supplies was also of constant occurrence during the protracted expedition via the Yazoo Pass.

 

On April 7, I received a telegram from the President, inquiring as to the practicability of sending re-enforcements to General Bragg in Middle Tennessee, and directing me to send them if existing circumstances in the department would admit of it.

 

On the same day I informed the President By telegram that, in my judgment, it was not safe to diminish the forces in this department at that time.

 

On April 9, I telegraphed General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General, as follows:

 

I am confident that few re-enforcements, if any, have been sent to Rosecrans from Grant; no troops whatever are reported to have gone above the mouth of the Yazoo Pass. I endeavor to keep General [J. E.] Johnston advised of any movement which may affect his army. The enemy is constantly in motion in all directions. He appears now to be particularly engaged with Deer Creek by land from Greenville. I have forces there to meet him. It is reported, but not yet confirmed, that a movement under McClernand in large force, by land, is in progress WEST of the river and southward. . I doubt it. My operations WEST of the Mississippi must greatly depend on the movement of the enemy's gunboats. I have several regiments now near New Carthage. I will inform you promptly of anything important, and if I ascertain that part of Grant's army is re-enforcing Rosecrans, will dispatch troops to General Johnston as rapidly as possible.

On April 11, I again telegraphed General Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General, and General J. E. Johnston, at Tullahoma, as follows:

 

A scout from Austin reports that forty transports, loaded down, but without troops, passed up the Mississippi River on the 3rd and 4th instant.

 

Brigadier-General Chalmers reports that-

 

Ellet's Marine Brigade passed up the Mississippi on the 7th. The same evening three gunboats and nineteen transports laded with troops passed up, the last ten boats from Tallahatchee, 20 miles up Coldwater, on Wednesday, going up. I think that most of Grant's forces are being withdrawn to Memphis.

 

On the same day I again telegraphed General Johnston as follows:

 

The following report just received: Scout Kemp reports, "Near Byhalia, on the 10th, the enemy is strengthening his guard on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.

 

Twelve thousand troops passed Memphis going up the river on the 7th. The same day FIFTY pieces of artillery were landed at Memphis and taken to the Memphis and Charleston depot. Part of Grant's army reported to be going to Corinth and down the Mobile and Ohio Railroad; the balance to re-enforce Rosecrans. "

 

Lawson reports near Memphis, 10th-

 

Marine Brigade gone up the Cumberland River; also fourteen transports and two gunboats passed up the river. On the night of the 7th, a corps of engineers reached Memphis from below.

 

Acting on these and other corroborating reports, I said to General Johnston, in closing my dispatch, "I am collecting troops here, and can send you 4,000 at once, if absolutely necessary; " and accordingly the brigades of Generals Tilghman, Rust, and Buford were, on April 13, placed under orders to move with dispatch to Tullahoma, while General Vaughn's brigade of East Tennesseeans was

 

ordered to be held in readiness to move at short notice. Major L. Mims, chief quartermaster, was instructed to furnish the necessary transportation as speedily as possible, and the following dispatch, dated April 12, was transmitted to General Johnston:

 

I will forward troops to you as fast as transportation can be furnished-about 8,000 men. Am satisfied Rosecrans will be re-enforced from Grant's army. Shall I order troops to Tullahoma?

 

On April 15, statements made by persons just out of Memphis, of which I was notified by telegraph, indicated that the retrograde movement from Vicksburg was probably a ruse, and that an early attack might be expected on that place; and on the 16th I telegraphed General Johnston thus:

 

I can send you only two brigades. The latest information induces the belief that no large part of Grant's army will be removed.

 

On the same day General Stevenson was directed to delay the movement of [J. C.] Vaughn's brigade, and on the 17th Major Mims, chief quartermaster, was instructed that no more troops would be forwarded in the direction of Tullahoma until further orders. General Tilghman's brigade was held in position between Jackson and the Big Black Bridge, and on the same day the following telegram was dispatched to General Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector GENERAL:

 

General Stevenson reports that eight boats attempted to pass Vicksburg last night; five succeeded in passing, one was burned and sunk, and two disabled. General Chalmers reports sixty-four steamers left Memphis on the 15th instant, loaded with troops and negroes, apparently with intention of making an assault on Vicksburg. The enemy has nine boats between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. I cannot send any more troops, and think that those on the way to General Johnston should come back.

 

General Bowen, at Grand Gulf, was immediately advised of the passage of the boats referred to in the above dispatch, and instructed to withdraw his troops from the Louisiana shore at the first favorable opportunity. He was also immediately re-enforced by the Sixth Mississippi Regiment, the First Confederate Battalion, and a field battery. On the same day the following telegram was dispatched to General Johnston:

 

The troops sent you were taken from Port Hudson-a brigade, under Brigadier-General Buford, aggregate present 4,065. The enemy has nine boats between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. He has landed forces at New Carthage from Grant's army, and can re-enforce them to any extent. He can use his nine boats to cross his troops to this side. The arrival of General Lorenzo Thomas has changed the enemy's plans, or his movement up the river was a ruse. I ought to have back Buford's brigade; certainly no more troops should leave this department. A dispatch from Brigadier-General Chalmers yesterday says sixty-four boats left Memphis since Thursday, loaded with soldiers and negroes, ostensibly to assault Vicksburg.

 

The raft in the Yazoo at Snyder's Mill has given away, and is entirely destroyed. I am, therefore, compelled to strengthen the batteries there at the expense of Vicksburg.

 

General Stevenson reports that eight boats passed the Bend last night. One was burned and two apparently disabled; the other five escaped uninjured.

 

Indications of an attack on Vicksburg are so strong that I am not warranted in sending any more troops from this department.

 

From information received after this dispatch was sent, I learned that eight of the enemy's most formidable gunboats, besides his transports and barges, succeeded in passing safely on the 16th.

 

I found it a very difficult matter to obtain the necessary hawsers and chains for the raft in the Yazoo, but it was speedily replaced under the active and energetic supervision of Mr. Thomas Weldon.

 

My request for the return of the troops forwarded to Middle Tennessee to re-enforce General Bragg was immediately complied with. A portion of them, however, had reached Chattanooga; the remainder were halted by telegraph at various points on the route, and the whole were restored to this department as soon as was practicable.

 

The enemy's vessels of war occupying the river between Vicksburg and Grand Gulf, it was impossible for me to operate effectually in the Trans-Mississippi Department to prevent the advance of the enemy to the WEST bank of the river.

 

On April 17, therefore, I addressed the following telegraphic communication to Captain E. Powell, assistant quartermaster at Natchez:

 

Forward the following to Lieutenant-General Smith or Major-General Taylor viz:

 

"For the want of the necessary transportation, I cannot operate effectually on the WEST bank of the river; the enemy is now in force at New Carthage and Richmond.

 

I beg your attention to this. "

 

Captain Powell notified me at once that this dispatch had been forwarded by courier.

 

On the 18th, I addressed a SECOND communication, through the same medium, as follows:

 

Lieutenant-General SMITH or Major-General TAYLOR:

 

The enemy are cutting a passage from near Young's Point to Bayou Vidal, to reach the Mississippi River near New Carthage. Without co-operation it is impossible to oppose him. Inform me what action you intend to take.

 

To these communications, and to a subsequent one of April 22, I

 

received no reply until after the capitulation of Vicksburg, when an acknowledgment of the receipt of that of the 22nd, dated May 20, reached me.

 

On the 19th, reports of raids in Northern Mississippi from several points in Tennessee reached me. All the available cavalry north of the Southern Railroad was at once placed at the disposal of Brigadier-Gen-erals Ruggles and Chalmers, commanding, respectively, the First and FIFTH Military Districts, which embraced all the northern portion of the State of Mississippi, and both were notified of the expected raids. Two companies of cavalry of Waul's Legion alone were ordered to report to Brigadier-General Barton at Warrenton. One of these marauding expeditions, under Colonel [Brigadier-General] Grierson, which crossed the Tallahatchee River at New Albany, succeeded in passing directly through the State, and eventually joined General Banks' forces at Baton Rouge, La. So great was the consternation created by this raid that it was impossible to obtain any reliable information of the enemy's movements, rumor placing him in various places at the same time.

 

On the 20th, I addressed the following telegram to General Johnston;

 

Can you not make a heavy demonstration with cavalry on the Tallahatchee toward Abbeville, if only for 50 miles? The enemy are endeavoring to compel a diversion of my troops to Northern Mississippi.

 

The same day the following communication was addressed to General Johnston, in response to one from him, asking if I could not send re-enforcements to the assistance of Colonel [P. D.] Roddey:

 

I have not sufficient force to give any efficient assistance to Colonel Roddey. The enemy are advancing from Memphis via Herndon, from Grand Junction and LA Grange via Holly Springs and Salem, and from Corinth via New Albany. You are aware that I have but a feeble cavalry force, but I shall certainly give you all the aid I can. I have literally no cavalry from Grand Gulf to Yazoo City, while the enemy is threatening to pass the river between Vicksburg and Grand Gulf, having now twelve vessels below the former place. A gunboat and one transport passed Austin on the 18th, having in tow FIFTEEN flat-boats, or pontoons, with twenty-five skiffs on them. Another transport passed Austin of the 19th, towing sixteen flats, or pontoons.

 

Brigadier-General Ruggles was directed to send all his available cavalry, both Confederate and State, at once toward Corinth, as a diversion in favor of Colonel Roddey; General Johnston having informed me that a superior force of the enemy from Corinth was in front of Roddey at Tuscumbia, and desiring me, if possible, to send aid to the latter. Having no available cavalry to meet the raid of Grierson, which was ravaging the northern portion of the State, I endeavored to employ a portion of Buford's brigade (infantry), then returning to the department, and directed the commanding officer of the first regiment, on his arrival at Meridian, to remain until further orders, to protect the most important points on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and there by succeeded in saving the valuable property, machinery, &c., at Enterprise, upon which town the enemy advanced and demanded its surrender, but Major-General Loring having reached there with a sufficient force of infantry in time, their object was frustrated. The enemy had previously succeeded in destroying several miles of the track of the Southern Railroad WEST of Chunkey River, which for more than a week greatly delayed the transportation of troops, and entirely prevented that of supplies (except by wagons) from our depots on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.

 

To meet these raids as far as possible, Major-General Loring was place in command of all the troops then on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. He was directed not to leave the line of the road for any great distance, to keep in telegraphic communication with me, and constantly to advise me of his position, and that, operations upon that line being minor in importance to those upon the Mississippi River, his troops must be so disposed as to enable him to move them in that direction at a moment's notice. The same day the following communication was addressed to General Johnston at Tullahoma:

 

Heavy raids are making from Tennessee deep into this State One is reported now at Starkville, 30 miles WEST of Columbus. Cavalry is indispensable to meet these expeditions. The little that I have is on the field there, but totally inadequate. Could you not make a demonstration with a cavalry force on their rear?

 

Another expedition having been reported moving across the country in a southwesterly direction from Pontotoc, Brigadier-General Featherston, then commanding Fort Pemberton, on the Yazoo, was ordered to move without delay toward Duck Hill or Winona, and General Tilghman, than at Canton, was directed to hold trains in readiness to move to Winona at a moment's notice. This became more necessary, as a heavy column of infantry as well as cavalry was reported moving from Memphis with the supposed view of taking possession of Grenada. The same day the following communication was telegraphed to General Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector GENERAL:

 

I have so little cavalry that I am compelled to divert a portion of my infantry to meet raids in Northern Mississippi. If any troops can possibly be spared from other departments, I think they should be sent here.

 

Every effort was made by me to provide cavalry to arrest Grierson's raid; also to accumulate a force for operations in the direction of Warrenton and Grand Gulf, thinking it quite as probable that Grierson would return by the route on which he was advancing as that he would continue his progress southward.

 

On the 24th, Brigadier-General Chalmers, at Panola, was directed to move, with all his cavalry and light artillery, via Oxford, to Okolona, to intercept the force of the enemy then at Newton Station, on the Southern Railroad. Captain [Samuel] Henderson, commanding special scouts at Grenada, was also instructed to send couriers to Generals Loring, Buford, and Ruggles, notifying those officers by telegrams from the nearest telegraph office, and advising each station on the road, that the enemy had reached Newton, on the Southern road. A force was also ordered to proceed from Jackson to Forrest, or Lake Station, or to such other points as circumstances might render necessary. Major-General Gardner, at Port Hudson, was notified that the enemy had reached the Southern Railroad-that it was probable he would endeavor to form a junction with Banks at Baton Rouge-and was instructed to send all his disposable cavalry to intercept him. Brigadier-General Featherston, with his brigade, then at or en route for Winona, was ordered to move to Grenada, if there was any approach of the enemy (as was reported) from the north on that place, unless he was also threatened by an advance from the east. As it was possible that Grierson's forces might return by Jackson, such arrangements as my means allowed were made to defend the capital of the State. Brigadier-General Tilghman, then at Canton, was authorized to mount one of his regiments being at the time on duty in Jackson. Similar authority was given to General Loring, then on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, to mount what force he could on that line. In the impressment of horses, and their necessary equipments, Major L. Mims, chief quartermaster, was materially aided by His Excellency the Governor of Mississippi, who was also earnestly advised to mount by the same process a portion of the State troops in Northern Mississippi. All the cavalry I could thus collect south of the Southern Railroad was placed under the orders of Colonel R. V. Richardson until he should fall in with Colonel Wirt Adams, who was then directed to assume command and direct the movements of the whole.

On the 28th, it was ascertained that Grierson was continuing his movement south of Hazlehurst, and not toward Grand Gulf or the Big Black Bridge. Colonel [Wirt] Adams was directed to follow him up and ambuscade him, if possible. These instructions were carried out as far as practicable, and resulted in a smart skirmish near Union Church. Colonel Adams' force, however, was too weak to effect anything important. Grierson, after suffering considerable loss by an ambuscade farther south, which was well planned and executed by a cavalry force from Major-General Gardner's command, eventually succeeded in joining General Banks' army at Baton Rouge.

 

I have been thus circumstantial in reciting the incidents connected with this celebrated raid that I might clearly demonstrate the great deficiency-I may almost say absence-of cavalry in my department, and the absolute impossibility of protecting my communications, depots, and even my most vital positions, without it; and, further, to show that consequent upon this want of cavalry I was compelled to employ infantry, and thus weaken my force in that arm at other important points. I wrote to General Johnston on March 25, urgently requesting that the DIVISION of cavalry under Major-General Van Dorn, which had been sent to the Army of Tennessee for special and temporary purposes, might be returned to me.

 

Under date of Tullahoma, April 3, Colonel B. S. Ewell, assistant adjutant-general, replied to my request, and from that reply I make the following extract:

 

In the present aspect of affairs, General Van Dorn's cavalry is much more needed in this department than in that of Mississippi and Eastern Louisiana, and cannot be sent back as long as this state of things exists. You have now in your department five brigades of the troops you most require, viz, infantry, belonging to the Army of Tennessee. This is more than a compensation for the absence of General Van Dorn's cavalry command.

 

I will terminate this subject with the following telegram, addressed to General Johnston at Tullahoma on April 27:

 

However necessary cavalry may be to the army in Tennessee, it is indispensable for me to maintain my communications. The enemy are to-day at Hazlehurst, on the New Orleans and Jackson Railroad. I cannot defend every station on the roads with infantry. I am compelled to bring cavalry here from Northern Mississippi, and thus the whole of that section of the State is left open; further, these raids endanger my vital positions.

 

When it seemed probable that the enemy would succeed in opening a navigable canal across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, and thus to a great extent avoid the batteries established there, I directed that Grand Gulf should be occupied, and as many heavy guns placed in position as could be without too much weakening the defenses of Vicksburg. Believing that the urgency of the case demanded it, I assumed the responsibility of detaining three heavy guns en route for the Trans-Mississippi Department, and withdrew two others from the batteries at Vicksburg. Insufficient as I knew this battery to be, it was the heaviest I could place there.

 

Fort Pemberton, on the Tallahatchee, then occupied our attention. The enemy in large force, by land and water, was exerting all his energies against that position, with the view of turning the right flank of Vicksburg, and every available gun was required for its defense. This necessity continued to exist until the fall of the rivers rendered an approach by water impracticable.

Grand Gulf was not selected as a position for land defense, but for the protection of the mouth of the Big Black, and also as a precaution- ary measure against the passage of transports, should the canal before referred to prove a success, which then seemed highly probable. The necessary works were, however, constructed, under the direction of Brigadier-General Bowen, to defend the batteries against an assault from the river front and against a direct attack from or across Big Black. When, however, the enemy succeeded in passing sufficient transports to cross his troops from the WEST bank of the river below Grand Gulf, there being a practicable route by which to move his land forces from above Vicksburg to a point nearly opposite Bruinsburg, the position of Grand Gulf itself lost most of its value; but so great were his facilities of transportation and so rapid his movements that it was impracticable to withdraw the heavy guns. The only means of subsisting an army south of Big Black are from Vicksburg or Jackson, the former requiring a transportation by dirt road of 40 and the latter of 45 miles, in addition to that by rail. Without cavalry I could not have protected my own communications, much less have cut those of the enemy. To have marched an army across Big Black of sufficient strength to warrant a reasonable hope of successfully encountering his very superior forces would have stripped Vicksburg and its essential flank defenses of their garrisons, and the city itself might have fallen and easy prey into the eager hands of the enemy.

The enemy having succeeded, on the night of April 16 (as heretofore related),, in passing the batteries at Vicksburg with a number of his gunboats and transports, and the report of a heavy movement to the southward on the Louisiana shore being fully confirmed, I immediately made the necessary dispositions for more perfectly guarding all points between Vicksburg and Grand Gulf, and re-enforced Brigadier-General Bowen with Green's brigade, the Sixth Mississippi Regiment, the First Confederate Battalion, and a battery of field artillery. Other troops were collected on the line of the railroad between Jackson and the Big Black Bridge, and measures were taken to get the troops that were being returned from Middle Tennessee into such positions that they could be readily moved at a moment's notice. Major-General Stevenson was directed to place 5,000 men in easy supporting distance of Warrenton, in addition to the brigade already there. Major [Samuel H.] Lockett, my chief engineer, was sent to Grand Gulf.

On the 22nd, I addressed a communication to Lieutenant General E. Kirby Smith, acknowledging the receipt of one from him of the 15th asking my co-operation on the WEST side of the Mississippi, and stating my inability to do so because of the enemy's gunboats in the river and from want of transportation, and again asking his co-operation in front of Grand Gulf and New Carthage.

The following telegram was addressed to Major-General Stevenson on the 23rd:

I consider it essential that communications, at least for infantry, should be made by the shortest practicable route to Grand Gulf. The indications now are that the attack will not be made on your front or right, and all troops not absolutely necessary to hold the works at Vicksburg should be held as a movable force for either Warrenton or Grand Gulf.

On the 28th, Brigadier-General Bowen telegraphed that "transports and barges loaded down with troops are landing at Hard Times, on the WEST bank. "

I immediately replied as follows:

Have you force enough to hold your position? If not, give me the smallest additional number with which you can. My small cavalry force necessitates the use of infantry to protect important points.

Major-General Loring, then at Meridian, was ordered to send two of his regiments across the break on the Southern Railroad, near Chunkey River, and Colonels [M.] Farrell and [A. E.] Reynolds, who were WEST of the break, were ordered to proceed immediately to Jackson. Major-General Buckner, commanding at Mobile, was notified that I should look to him to assist me in protecting the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, as I required all the troops I could spare to strengthen General Bowen. Major-General Gardner, at Port Hudson, was also ordered to move Gregg's brigade rapidly to Jackson. Brigadier-General Tilghman, then on the Mississippi Central Railroad, was directed to move promptly with all of his troops (save bridge guards) to Jackson. Major [M. R.] Clark, commanding at Brookhaven, was instructed to send couriers to all cavalry commanders near him, ordering them to move toward Grand Gulf, with directions not to encounter the main body of the enemy, but to harass him in the rear and flank. Similar instructions were forwarded to Osyka and Hazlehurst. To General Johnston, at Tullahoma, the following telegram was sent:

The enemy is at Hard Times, La., in large force, with barges and transports, indicating an attack on Grand Gulf, with a view to Vicksburg. I must look to the Army of Tennessee to protect the approaches through Northern Mississippi.

The following also to Major-General Stevenson at Vicksburg:

Hold 5,000 men in readiness to move them. With your batteries and rifle-pits manned, the city front is impregnable.

To General Bowen, at the same time, the following was sent:

I have directed General Stevenson to have 5,000 men ready to move on your requisition, but do not make requisition unless absolutely necessary for the safety of your position. I am also making arrangements for sending you 2,000 or 3,000 men from this direction in case of necessity. You cannot communicate with me too frequently.

I believe that I fully estimated the importance of preventing an advance upon Jackson, if it could be done without sacrificing Vicksburg; but if the latter was lost, the former was comparatively of little value. Vicksburg might still be held with Jackson in possession of the enemy, but it was the hope of being able to hold the position on Bayou Pierre, upon which the safety of Jackson depends, that made me most anxious to re-enforce General Bowen, or, failing in that, at least to have a sufficient force at hand to secure his retreat across the Big Black.

On April 30, I received the first information of the landing of the enemy on the east bank of the Mississippi River. General Bowen reported by telegraph that 3,000 Federal troops were at Bethel Church, 10 miles from Port Gibson, at 3 o'clock on the evening of the 29th, and that they were still landing at Bruinsburg. Brigadier-General Tracy, of Stevenson's DIVISION, had reached Grand Gulf with his brigade on the 30th. Lieutenant-Colonel [William N.] Brown, of the Twentieth Mississippi, with 50 mounted men of his regiment, left Jackson for the same place on the 29th, and Major J. D. Bradford, a good artillery officer, was sent to replace the lamented Colonel [William] Wade, as chief of artillery.

Between 12 m. and 2 p. m. on the 30th, Brigadier-General Baldwin, with his brigade, of Smith's DIVISION, had crossed the Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry.

At 9 a. m. May 1, General Bowen informed me by telegraph, his army being then in position 3 miles south of Port Gibson, that General Baldwin was entering the latter place. On the same day General Bowen telegraphed me that prisoners taken reported McClernand in command; that three DIVISIONS had landed, one of which took the right hand road from Rodney, and that the enemy's force was estimated at 20,000 men. He adds, however, "I disbelieve the report. " At 3 p. m. the same day, General Bowen advised me that he still held his position, but that he was hard pressed, and concluded by asking when Major-General Loring would arrive. In reply, he was notified by telegram that another brigade from Vicksburg was en route to re-enforce him, and would probably reach him before Major-General Loring could arrive from Jackson. At 5. 30 p. m. he informed me that he was falling back across the Bayou Pierre, and that he would endeavor to hold that position until the arrival of re-enforcements. On reaching Rocky Springs, about 18 miles from Grand Gulf, Major-General Loring, learning that Brigadier-General Bowen had fallen back before a large force from Port Gibson in the direction of Grand Gulf, directed two regiments and a field battery of Tilghman's brigade, which had been withdrawn from the Big Black Bridge, to move as rapidly as possible to Grindstone Ford, and hold it at all hazards, to prevent the enemy from flanking Bowen in that direction, and then proceeded himself to the headquarters of General Bowen, near Grand Gulf. Major-General Loring, concurring with General Bowen as to the impracticability of holding his position with so small a force, directed its withdrawal across Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry.

 

In his official report Major-General Loring says:

 

This had hardly been determined upon, when your communication was received, stating that the army had fallen back toward Grand Gulf,, and ordering it to move at once out of its position, and to cross the Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry.

The movement was promptly carried out. Previous to crossing the river, however, Colonel A. W. Reynolds' brigade, of Stevenson's DIVISION, had arrived. Not having heard from General Bowen after 5. 30 p. m. on the 1st instant, I dispatched him, via Rocky Springs, on the morning of the 2nd, as follows:

If you are holding your position on the Bayou Pierre, and your communication is open by the Big Black to this place, continue to hold it. I am informed that you have fallen back to Grand Gulf. If this is so, carry out my instructions, just sent in cipher.

These instructions were, in case he had fallen back to Grand Gulf, which is a cul-de-sac, to destroy his heavy guns and such stores as could not be transported, and endeavor to retire across the Big Black. The last brigade of Major-General Stevenson's DIVISION, which had been hurried forward to re-enforce Bowen, with the hope of enabling him to hold his position on the Bayou Pierre, or, in case he should be compelled to fall back, to protect his retreat, had not all arrived when the retiring column, under Major-General Loring, commenced crossing the Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry.

For the details of the battle of Port Gibson, the list of casualties, &c., I beg to refer to the official report of Brigadier-General Bowen and the reports of his subordinate commanders, which I have the honor to transmit herewith,* as also the report of Major-General Loring, who commanded the retreat after the column had been put in motion by Brigadier-General Bowen.

Among the slain whom the country deplores I regret to mention Brigadier General E. D. Tracy, a brave and skillful officer, who fell where it is the soldier's pride to fall-at the post of duty and of danger.

Though disastrous in its results, the bloody encounter in front of Port Gibson nobly illustrated the valor and constancy of our troops, and shed additional luster upon the Confederate arms. Confronted by overwhelming numbers, the heroic Bowen and his gallant officers and men maintained the unequal contest for many hours with a courage and obstinacy rarely equaled, and though they failed to secure a victory, the world will do them the justice to say they deserved it. With a moderate cavalry force at my disposal, I am firmly convinced that the Federal Army under General Grant would have been unable to maintain its communications with the Mississippi River, and that the attempt to reach Jackson and Vicksburg from that base would have been as signally defeated in May, 1863, as a like attempt from another base had by the employment of cavalry been defeated in December, 1862.

The repulse of General Bowen at Port Gibson, and our consequent withdrawal to the north bank of the Big Black, rendered it necessary that I should as rapidly as possible concentrate my whole force for the defense of Vicksburg from and attack in the rear by Grant's army, which was hourly swelling its numbers. Orders, therefore, were immediately transmitted to the officers in command at Grenada, Columbus, and Jackson to move all available forces to Vicksburg as rapidly as possible.

On the morning of the 3rd, two of the enemy's barges, loaded with hospital and commissary stores, were destroyed in attempting to pass the batteries at Vicksburg.

On the 5th, I telegraphed General Johnston that-

Six thousand cavalry should be used to keep my communications open, and that the enemy advancing on me was double what I could bring into the field.

To the honorable Secretary of War I sent the following telegram, under date of May 6:

General Beauregard sends but two brigades, perhaps not 5,000 men. This is a very insufficient number. The stake is a great one. I can see nothing so important.

On the 7th, the President notified me that all the assistance in his power to send should be forwarded, and that it was deemed necessary to hold Port Hudson as a means of keeping up our communications with the Trans-Mississippi Department. Major-General Gardner, who, with Brigadier-General Maxey and 5,000 men, had previously been ordered to Jackson to re-enforce this army, was immediately directed to send Maxey's brigade rapidly forward, and to return himself with 2,000 men to Port Hudson, and hold the place at all hazards.

On the 7th, indications rendered it probable that the enemy would make a raid on Jackson. The staff departments, therefore, and all valuable stores, were ordered to be removed east.

In the mean time my troops were so disposed as to occupy the Warrenton and Hall's Ferry road, which afforded great facilities for concentration, and various positions on the Baldwin's Ferry road, and from thence between Bovina and Edwards Depot, each DIVISION being in good supporting distance of the other. Colonel [T. N.] Waul, commanding Fort Pemberton, was directed to leave a garrison of 300 men at that place, and proceed with the remainder of his force to Snyder's Mill.

 

On the 10th, information was received from a scouting party that visited Cayuga and Utica, where the enemy had recently been, that his cavalry force was about 2,000, and that he was supposed to be moving on Vicksburg. My dispositions were made accordingly, and every effort was used to collect all the cavalry possible. Such as could be obtained were placed under the command of Colonel Wirt Adams, who was directed to harass the enemy on his line of march, cut his communications wherever practicable, patrol the country thoroughly, and to keep Brigadier- General Gregg (who had just arrived with his brigade from Port Hudson and was then at Raymond) fully advised off the enemy's movements.

 

On the 11th, Brigadier General John Adams, commanding at Jackson, was directed to hurry forward, as fast as they could arrive, the troops from South Carolina, to re-enforce Brigadier-General Gregg at Raymond. At this time information was received from Brigadier-General Tilghman that the enemy was in force opposite Baldwin's Ferry, and Gregg was notified accordingly, and informed that the enemy's movements were apparently toward the Big Black Bridge, and not, as had been supposed, against Jackson.

 

On the 12th, the following was addressed to Major-General Stevenson:

 

From information received, it is evident the enemy is advancing in force on Edwards Depot and Big Black Bridge; hot skirmishing has been going on all the morning, and the enemy are at Fourteen-Mile Creek. You must move up with your whole DIVISION to the support of Loring and Bowen at the bridge, leaving Baldwin's and Moore's brigades to protect your right.

In consequence of this information, Brigadier-General Gregg was ordered not to attack the enemy until he was engaged at Edwards or the bridge, but to be ready to fall on his rear or flank at any moment, and to be particularly cautious not to allow himself to be flanked or taken in the rear. Thus it will be seen that every measure had been taken to protect Edwards Depot and Big Black Bridge, and, by offering or accepting battle, to endeavor to preserve my communications with the east. At this juncture, however, the battle of Raymond was fought by a large body of the enemy's forces and one brigade of our troops under the command of Brigadier-General Gregg.

 

I have received no official report of that affair, and hence cannot say how it was fought or by whom the engagement was brought on. Unofficial information represents Brigadier-General Gregg and his small command to have behaved with great gallantry and steadiness, but after an obstinate conflict of several hours they were finally overwhelmed by superior numbers and compelled to retire. The command was with drawn in good order, and retired to Jackson.

 

On the 14th, a large body of the enemy made their appearance in front of Jackson, the capital of the State. After some fighting, our troops were withdrawn, and the enemy took possession of the place; but as General Johnston was commanding there in person, his official report, which has doubtless gone forward, will furnish all the information required.

 

On the 12th, the following telegram was sent to General J. E. Johnston:

 

The enemy is apparently moving his heavy force toward Edward Depot, on Southern Railroad; with my limited force I will do all I can to meet him. That will be the battle-field if I can carry forward sufficient force, leaving troops enough to secure the safety of this place (Vicksburg). Re-enforcements are arriving very slowly, only 1,500 having arrived as yet. I urgently ask that more be sent; also that 3,000 cavalry be at once sent to operate on this line. I urge this as a positive necessity. The enemy largely outnumber me, and I am obliged to hold back a large force at the ferries on Big Black lest he cross and take this place. I am also compelled to keep considerable force on either flank of Vicksburg out of supporting distance.

 

The same dispatch was also sent to His Excellency President Davis on the same date.

 

The DIVISIONS of Major-Generals Loring and Stevenson moved from the line they had occupied between Warrenton and Big Black Bridge to Edwards Depot, General Stevenson being directed to keep well closed upon the rear of General Loring's column.

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sent up the river. Two companies were directed to remain at Snyder's Mill, making a show of force until the approach of the enemy by land should compel them to retire. To them was intrusted the duty of forwarding all stores possible and of destroying the remainder. This detachment rejoined its command in Vicksburg on the morning of the 18th. Every precaution was taken to guard the important approaches to the city by Forney's and Smith's DIVISIONS, while the troops which had been engaged in the battles of the 16th and 17th were bivouacked in rear of the intrenchments. During these battles, the troops of Major-General Forney's DIVISION were disposed as follows: Brigadier-General Hebert's brigade occupied the line along the Yahoo River, from Haynes' Bluff to the Mississippi, including the approaches by Chickasaw Bayou; Brigadier-General [J. C.] Moore's brigade, with the Mississippi State troops (under General [John V.] Harris) attached (about 600), guarded the river front at Warrenton and the approaches from the lower ferries on Big Black River; Brigadier-General [F. A.] Shoup's brigade, of Major General Smith's DIVISION, guarded the river front of the city; Brigadier-General [W. E.] Baldwin's brigade, with [T. N.] Waul's Legion attached, guarded the approaches to the city from the Hall's Ferry road around to the railroad bridge on the Big Black; the heavy artillery at the batteries on the river front under Colonel [Edward] Higgins. Brigadier-General Moore's brigade was drawn in at once from Warrenton, and placed in the intrenchments on either side of the Baldwin's Ferry road. Brigadier-General Hebert's brigade arrived before daylight on the 18th, bringing with it all the light pieces, and, in addition, two 20-pounder Parrotts and a Whitworth gun. This brigade immediately occupied the intrenchments on both sides of the Jackson road.

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On the morning of the 18th, the troops were disposed from right to left, as follows: Major-General Stevenson's DIVISION of four brigades occupied the line from the Warrenton road, including a portion of the river front, to the railroad, a distance of about 5 miles; Major-General Forney, with two brigades, the line between the railroad and the Graveyard road, about 2 miles, and Major-General Smith, with three brigades (the Mississippi State troops) and a small detachment from Loring's DIVISION, the line from the Graveyard road to the river front on the north, about 1 1/4 miles. Brigadier-General Bowen's DIVISION was held in reserve to strengthen any portion of the line most threatened, and Waul's Texas Legion (about 500) was in reserve, especially to support the right of Moore's or the left of Lee's brigades. On the entire line about one hundred and two pieces of artillery, of different caliber, principally field, were placed in position at such points as were deemed most suitable to the character of the gun, changes of location being made when occasion called for it. An engineer officer, under the supervision of Major Lockett, chief engineer of the department, was assigned to each DIVISION, with an assistant to each brigade commander. Daily reports were made through the proper channel to Major Lockett of the operations of the engineer department and of the progress of the enemy's works. Major Lockett thus kept me constantly informed of all important changes, making himself a daily report. Instructions had been given from Bovina that all cattle, sheep, and hogs belonging to private parties, and likely to fall into the hands of the enemy, should be driven within our lines. A large amount of fresh meat was secured in this way. The same instructions were given in regard to corn, and all disposable wagons applied to this end.

 

On the 18th, Colonel Wirt Adams, who had been previously directed to cross to the WEST bank of the Big Black with all his cavalry, was noti-

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p273

The development of the intrenched line from the extreme right of Major-General Stevenson's position to the left of Major-General Smith's was about 8 miles, the shortest defensible line of which the topography of the country admitted. The plan was submitted to me immediately after I assumed command of the Department of Mississippi and Eastern Louisiana, in the latter part of October, 1862; was approved, and ordered to be carried out with the utmost dispatch. Similar instructions were about the same time given for fortifying the strong position at Snyder's Mill, and the land defenses of Port Hudson were also ordered to be commenced at once. The line of defense around the city of Vicksburg consisted (as is shown in the map accompanying the report of Major [S. H.] Lockett, chief engineer) of a system of detached works (redans, lunettes, and redoubts) on the prominent and commanding points, with the usual profile of raised field works, connected in most cases by rifle-pits. To man the entire line, I was able to bring into the trenches about eighteen thousand five hundred muskets, but it was absolutely necessary to keep a reserve always ready to re-enforce any point heavily threatened. It became indispensable, therefore, to reduce the number in the trenches to the minimum capable of holding them until a reserve could come to their aid. It was also necessary that the reserve should be composed of troops among the best and most reliable. Accordingly, Bowen's DIVISION (about 2,400) and Waul's Texas Legion (about 500) were designated for that purpose, thus reducing the force in the trenches to little over 15,500 men. The Legion was on the 18th assigned as a reserve to Forney's DIVISION, and was held in rear of Brigadier-General Moore's right, but on the evening of the 19th was transferred to Stevenson's DIVISION, and during the remainder of the siege was held in rear of Brigadier-General Lee's brigade, occupying one of the most exposed and important positions on the whole line.

 

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p274

The angle of one of our redoubts having been breached by their artillery previous to the assault, when the repulse occurred, a party of about 60 of the enemy, under the command of a lieutenant-colonel, made a rush, and succeeded in effecting a lodgment in the ditch at the foot of the redoubt, and planted two colors on the parapet. It was of vital importance to drive them out, and, upon a call for volunteers for that purpose, two companies of Waul's Texas Legion, commanded, respectively, by Captain [L. D.] Bradley and Lieutenant [James] Hogue, accompanied by the gallant and chivalrous Colonel E. W. Pettus, of the Twentieth Alabama Regiment, musket in hand, promptly presented themselves for the hazardous service. Of their success and the manner in which it was achieved, General Stevenson says:

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p275

Colonel Waul's Legion had previously been sent to General Stevenson,, but Green's brigade, of Bowen's DIVISION, was in reserve behind my right, and assisted in repelling the attack at that point. There were also on this day two Louisiana regiments of Smith's DIVISION in reserve behind my DIVISION.

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